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[Crlm. No. 5485. In Bank. Dec. 22, 1953.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. WILLIE DELONEY, 
Appellant. 
[1] Homicide - Appeal- Modification of Jud.gment.-Although 
jury in a homicide case could have concluded from evidence 
that the killing was committed in a brawl on sudden impulse 
when defplldant's emotions were aroused and his inhibitions 
removed by alcohol and thus have returned a verdict of lower 
degree of homicide than flrst degree murder, the Supreme 
Court cannot reduce offense to a lower degree of homicide if 
jury could also have concluded from evidence that the ldlling 
was result of delib~ration and premeditation. 
[i] Id.-Evidence-DeHberation and Premeditation.-Where there 
was evidence in a homicide ease that defendant intervened 
in a quarrel between deceased and another man and stated to 
the latter, ''If I had your gun, if I was you, I would have 
killed him," thereby indicating that there was then animosity 
between defendant and deceased, and where, after withdraw-
ing from a tlst tight with deceased, defendant procured such 
gun from the other man and, regardless of consequences and 
despite warnings and efforts of his friends, was determined 
to kill deceased and, in the ensuing tight, after both defendant 
and deceased were disarmed, defendant seized gun at first 
opportunity and twice shot his victim, and thereafter, when 
his opponent was helpless on the ground, defendant emptied 
McIt. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 273; [2] Homicide, § 158; 
{S) Homicide, § 179(5); [4,9] Homicide, § 268; [5] Criminal Law, 
1691; [6] Homicide, §141; [7,10) Homicide, 1229(1); [8] Bomi-
eide, 1142; [11] Homicide, § 22·2; [12] Homicide, 1261. 
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gun into victim's body, telling spectators and deceased's wife 
that he had intended to kill deceased and had carried out 
that intention, the Supreme Court cannot say that jury could 
not reasonably conclude that killing was result of deliberation 
and premeditation. 
[8] ld. - Instructions - Deliberation and Premeditation.-An in-
struction in a homicide case that "a man may do a thing 
wilfully, deliberately and intentionally from a moment's re-
Section as well as after pondering over the subject for a 
month or years," and "He can premeditate, that is, think 
before doing the act, the moment he conceives the purpose, 
as well as if the act were the result of long preconcert or 
preparation," unduly emphasized that there need be little 
time to form intent to kill or little time between formation 
of intent to kill and execution thereof, and may have misled 
jury in concluding that though the killing was hasty and 
hurried, impUlsive and unstudied, it was nevertheless first 
degree murder. 
[4] ld.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions.-
Error in an instruction in a homicide case that a man may 
do a thing deliberately and intentionally from a moment's 
rellection was not cured by another instruction correctly de-
fining the deliberation and premeditation required to establish 
first degree murder, sinee this created an irreconcilable con1lict 
between the instructions, .. nd Supreme Court cannot speculate 
which of them the jury followed. 
[5] Criminal Law-Instnictions - Cautiona17 Instructions..;.. Ad-
missions.-ln a homicide ease, trial court should give an iD-
struction on its own motion that admissions of defendant &l'8 
to be viewed with caution. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2061, subd. 4.) 
[6] Homicide-Burden of Proof.-lil a homicide ease, bUrden 
is on the People to prove defendant guilty of first degree 
murder beyond a tea.'1onable doubt. 
[7] ld.-Instructions-Burden of Proof-Mitigation.-An instruc-
tion in language of Pen. Code, § n05, concerning defendant's 
. burden of proving mitigating circumstances when commission 
of homicide by him is shown, without advising jury that such 
instruction would have no application. in determining degree 
of murder and that it could apply only in determining whether 
homicide was murder or manslaughter, or was excusable O! 
[3] See Cal.Jur.. Homicide, 114 et seq.; Am.Jur., Homicide, 
1142,536. 
[5] See Oal.Jur., Criminal Law, § 359; Am.Jur., Trial, § 6U 
. et seq. 
[7] See Oal.Jur.. Homicide, 1103 et seq. j Am.Jur., Homicide, 
1285 et seq. 
Q c.Jd-.ll 
) 
834 PEOPLE tI. DELONEY [41 C.2d 
justifiable, was error, particularly where one of most difficult 
questions before jury was whether homicide was first degree 
murder, second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. 
[8] ld.-Burden of Proof-Mitigation.-Pen. Code, § 1105, does 
not place on defendant the burden of persuasion, but merely 
declares a rule of procedure that imposes on him a duty of 
going forward with evidence of mitigating circumstances. 
[9] ld.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions.-
Error in instructing jury in language of Pen. Code, § 1105, 
was not cured by additional statements that proof of circum-
stances of mitigation need not be by a preponderance of 
evidence, but only to extent sufficient to raise reasonable doubt 
in .mnds of jurors as to defendant's guilt or mitigating cir-
cumstances, they not having been expressly told that prosecu-
tion has burden throughout trial to prove every element of 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt and that burden of persuasion 
never shifts to defendant. 
[10] :tri.-Instructions - Burden of Proof - Mitigation.-An in-
struction in language of Pen. Code, § 1105, even with an ade-
quate explanation of its meaning, has no proper place in 
charge to jury. 
[11] ld.-Instructions-Self-defense.-ln a homicide case, it was 
proper to give instructions that right of self-defense exists 
only as against an unlawful attack, that one attacked by 
assault with fists is not justified in using a deadly weapon if 
assault is not likely to produce great bodily injury, and that 
the law does not permit or justify one who intends to commit 
an assault to design in advance his own defense by instigating 
a quarrel, where each instruction was justified by the evidence. 
[12] ld.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions. 
-In a homicide case, errors in an instruction on premeditation 
and deliberation and in an instruction in language of Pen. Code, 
§ 1105, which failed to advise jury that it had no application 
in its determination of degree of murder, and in failing to 
give cautionary instruction with regard to admissions of de-
fendant as required by Code Civ. Proc., § 2061, subd. 4, re-
quired reversal of judgment of conviction of first degree 
murder to avoid a miscarriage of justice, where it was not im-
probable that a correctly instructed jury would have reached 
a different verdict, and where the evidence, though sufficient 
to sustain a conviction of first degree murder, would readily 
justify a conviction of a lesser degree of homicide. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239b) 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County, 
and from an order denying a new trial. B. C. Hawkins, 
Judge. Reversed. 
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Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction of 'first 
degree murder imposing death penalty, Teversed. 
Rodin, Nelson & Coffin and Robert R. Coffin fOT Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Doris H. Maier, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant Willie Deloney was charged 
by information with the murder of Ollie Stillwell. He pleaded 
not guilty. The jury returned a verdict of murder in the 
first degree without recommendation. Defendant's motion 
for a new trial was denied, and he was sentenced to death. 
The appeal to this court is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239b.) 
The killing occurred at about 8 :20 p. m. on February 15, 
1953, at Bob's Barbecue, a cafe and bar located in the Monte 
Vista Tract on Crow's Landing Road, Stanislaus County. 
Defendant had been in the bar most of the day drinking beer. 
Stillwell and his wife, Willie Stillwell, had spent the afternoon 
in Stockton with Golie Turner and Willie Crawford and had 
had several drinks. They returned in Turner's car, after 
stopping for a short time at Modesto. Turner left the Still-
wells at their home, a block or two from the bar. Turner and 
Crawford continued on to the bar. Defendant was dancing 
by himself on the dance Hoor and playing the juke box and 
piano. About 8 p. m. Stillwell and his wife came to the bar. 
Bill Allen, known as Cowboy, asked Stillwell to buy him 
a drink. Stillwell's refusal led to an argument. Willie 
Stillwell took her husband by the colJar and dragged him 
outside. Crawford tried to persuade Stillwell to go home. 
Cowboy and defendant came out, and Cowboy and Stillwell 
resumed their argument. Cowboy had a .22 caliber pistol 
in his belt, but made no attempt to use it. , Cowboy and Still-
well scufBed for a few minutes and then Cowboy entered the 
bar. 
As he passed through the doorway defendant said to him, 
"If I had your gun, if I was you, I would have killed him." 
Stillwell overheard this remark. A fist fight followed between 
the two, aud Stillwell knocked defendant down two or three 
times. Calvin Belford, known as Roger, joined the fight and 
seized Stillwell from behind and threw him to the ground. 
Roger was forced to let go his grip when Willie Stillwell bit 
him in the back. Defendant got to his feet and returned 
with Cowboy to the baT. Stillwell and his wife remained out-
/ 
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side. Defendant and Cowboy went to the back part of the 
bar. Defendant asked for the gun, and Cowboy gave it to 
him. Defendant started for the door, waving the gun, when one 
of the other patrons seized him and threw him to the floor, say-
ing, "Willie, you're not to get in no trouble like that." De-
fendant tried to get up, shouting, "Turn me loose, I'll kill 
him." The bartender, not realizing that defendant had the 
gun, told the men to let him go, and they released· him. 
One of the men shouted, "Stillwell, Deloney got a pistol. 
You better start running if you're going to run. If you stay, 
you're going to fight him." Stillwell went to his car, took 
off his overcoat, folded it, placed it in his car, took a tire pump 
from the turtle back, and then rolled up his sleeves. He re-
turned to the side of the building near the door and by a 
window where he could see inside the bar. Defendant paused 
at the door with the gun in his hand by his side and was 
pushed by a man behind him that two of the witnesses iden-
tified as Cowboy. As defendant passed through the doorway, 
Stillwell struck him on the side of the head with the tire 
pump. Defendant dropped the gun and fell to the ground 
near a parked car. Stillwell attempted to strike him a second 
time, but the tire pump hit the side of t.be car and was knocked 
from his hands. Stillwell leaped upon defendant and struck 
him repeatedly in the face with his bands. Stillwell made 
no attempt to pick up the gun. 
As the two men rolled on the ground, defendant managed 
to regain the gun with his right hand. Stillwell seized de-
fendant's right hand with his own left hand and continued 
to strike defendant in the face with his right hand. Defendant 
was still on the ground with Stillwell crouching over him, 
when defendant fired one shot into the ground and then 
twisted the gun around and fired two shots into Stillwell's 
body. Stillwell fell to the ground. Defendant got to his 
feet and walked to the door of the bar. He said to the spec-
tators, "I told you guys I was going to kill him." He turned 
back, stood over Stillwell, who had not moved since the first 
shots, and said, "I told you I was going to kill you." He then 
fired the gun into Stillwell's body until the gun clicked sev-
eral times on empty chambers. Stillwell's wife, who had 
been holding RQger from the fight, came running to the scene 
and asked defendant if he had killed Stillwell. Defendant 
said, "Yes I killed him. I told you I was going to kill him, 
so I killed him." Defendant returned to the bar and waited 
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other before the shooting, but there is no evidence of any 
previous animosity between them. 
The foregoing evidence was presented by the People. The 
defense rested at the close of the People's case. 
Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sus-
tain a conviction of first degree murder. On the record the 
killing could come within the statutory definition of first 
degree murder only on the ground that it was willful, deliber-
ate, and premeditated. (Pen. Code, § 189.) Defendant urges 
that the killing was done in anger without deliberation and 
premeditation. He points to the evidence that he had been 
drinking, that there was no previous animosity between him 
and Stillwell, that he did not arm himself until after a fist 
fight with Stillwell, and that he did not fire the fatal shots 
until after he had been repeatedly struck on the head and face 
by his victim. He contends that there is no evidence of any 
motive that might indicate deliberation or premeditation, that 
the killing was committed in a brawl on sudden impulse when 
his emotions were aroused and his inhibitions removed by 
alcohol and the blows he had received, that considering the 
character of the affray, either of the principals might have 
been killed, and that it was a fortuitous circumstance that 
it was Stillwell and not the defendant. 
[1] The jury could certainly have drawn the foregoing 
conclusions from the evidence and returned a verdict of a 
lower degree of homicide than first degree murder. (People 
v. Tubby, 34 Ca1.2d 72, 77-78 [207 P.2d 51] ; People v. Bender, 
27 Ca1.2d 164, 178-180 [163 P.2d 8) '; People v. Holt, 25 Ca1.2d 
59, 92-93 [153 P.2d 21J ; People v. Fields, 99 Cal.App.2d 10, 
13-14 [221 P.2d 190] ; People v. Daniel, 65 Cal.App.2d 622, 
635 [151 P.2d 275].) We cannot reduce the offense to a 
lesser degree of homicide, however, if the jury couId also 
conclude from the evidence that the killing was not on sudden 
impulse in the heat of passion when defendant's inhibitions 
were removed, but was the result of deliberation and pre-
meditation. [2] There was ample time in the interval be-
tween defendant's intervention in the quarrel between Cow-
boy and Stillwell and the firing of the fatal shots for defendant 
to contemplate the killing of Stillwell and to weigh and con-
sider the consequences. The crucial question is whether the 
jury could find that he did so or was bound to conclude that 
during that time defendant's emotions were so aroused and 
his acts and statements so rash and impetuous that there was 
no reflection or weighing of considerations either before or 
) 
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after the intent to kill was formed. Defendant's intervention 
in the quarrel between Cowboy and Stillwell and his state-
ment to Cowboy at that time, "If I had your gun, if I was 
you, I would have killed him," indicates that there was then 
animosity between defendant and Stillwell and that defendant 
was not only not adverse to killing Stillwell but thought that 
Cowboy should have done so. After withdrawing from his 
:fist fight with Stillwell, defendant entered the bar to get the 
gun. His friends attempted to persuade him to remain in 
the bar and not to .. get in no trouble like that. "Thus, re-
gardless of consequences and despite the warnings and efforts 
of his friends, defendant was determined to kill Stillwell. In 
the ensuing fight outside, after both defendant and Stillwell 
were disarmed, defendant seized the gun at the first oppor-
tunity and twice shot his victim. When his opponent was 
helpless on the ground, either unconscious or dead. and all 
danger to defendant was past, he emptied the gun into his 
body. He told the spectators and Stillwell's wife that he had 
intended to kill Stillwell and had carried out that intention. 
In the light of this evidence, we cannot say that the jury could 
not reasonably conclude that the killing was the l'esult of 
deliberation and premeditation. (People v. Gilliam, 39 Cal. 
2d 235, 239 [246 P.2d 31] ; People v. Hooper, 35 Cal.2d 165, 
168 [216 P.2d 876] ; Peop1,e v. Is'by. 30 Cal.2d 879. 888-890 
[186 P.2d 405].) 
[3] Defendant contends that the instruction on delibera-
tion and premeditation was prejudicially erroneous. The 
court gave the following instruction: "You are instructed that 
a man may do a thing wilfully, deliberately and intentionally 
from a moment's reflection as well as after pondering over 
the subject for a month or years. He can premeditate, that 
is think before doing the act, the moment he conceives the 
purpose, as well as if the act were the result of long pre-
concert or preparation. There is nothing in the sections of 
the Penal Code which relate to this subject, which indicate 
that the Legislature meant to assign any particular period 
to this process of deliberation or premeditation, in order to 
bring the act within the first degree." 
This court has repeatedly condemned similar instructions 
on the ground that they lead the jury to believe that neither 
deliberation nor premeditation, in the commonly understood 
meaning of those terms, need be proved by the People. 
(People v. Carmen, 36 Ca1.2d 768, 777-778 [228 P.2d 281] ; 
Peop1,e v. Cornett, 33 Cal.2d 33, 40-42 [198 P.2d 877]; People 
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v. Honeycutt, 29 Ca1.2d 52, 60-61 [172 P.2d 698] ; People v. 
Valentine, 28 Ca1.2d 121, 134 [169 P.2d 1] ; People v. Bender, 
27 Ca1.2d 164, 182-183 [163 P.2d 8) ; People v. Thomas, 25 
Ca1.2d 880, 900-901 [156 P.2d 7).) 
Th@ instruction has the same vices as the one given in 
People v. Bender, supra. The statements that, u a man may 
do a thing wilfully, deliberately and intentionally from a 
moment's reflection as well as after pondering over the sub-
ject for a month or years," and "He can premeditate, that is, 
think before doing the act,the moment he conceives the 
purpose, as well as if the act were the result of long pre-
concert or preparation," are word-for-word the same as the 
instruction condemned in the Bender case. (27 Ca1.2d at 182.) 
The instruction unduly emphasizes that there need be little 
time to form the intent to kill or little time between the 
formation of the intent to kill and the execution thereof, and 
may have misled the jury ,. into thinking that an act can at 
the same time be hasty, hurried, and deliberate, or impUlsive, 
unstudied, and premeditated." (People v. Bender, supra, 
27 Ca1.2d at 185.) 
[4J Another instruction stated: "[B)efore you can bring 
back a verdict of murder in the first degree, you must find that 
the killing was accompanied and was preceded by a clear, de-
liberate intent to take life; an intent on the part of the de-
fendant to kill, which must be the result of deliberation and 
premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon a pre-
existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion 
or other condition such as precludes the idea of deliberation. 
To be murder in the first degree you must find that at the 
moment WILLIE DELONEY fired the shot which was fatal to 
OLLIE STILLWELL that he had a clear deliberate intention to 
take the life of OLLIE STILLWELL, and you must further find 
that this deliberate and clear intention to take the life of 
OLLIE STILLWELL had been formed upon a pre-existing re-
flection and that at the time that the defendant fired the fatal 
shot that he was not acting under the sudden heat of passion, 
or as to any other condition which precludes the idea of de-
liberation. " 
Since the foregoing instruction is a correct statement of the 
law (People v. Daugherty, 40 Ca1.2d 876, 901-902 [256 P.2d 
911]), the People contend that any error in the first instruc-
tion was cured. It is obvious, however, that there is an irre-
concilable conflict in the instructions, and we are not at 
liberty to speculate as to which of them the jury followed. 
) 
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(People v. Carmen, supra, 36 Ca1.2d 768, 778; People v. 
Cornett supra, 33 Ca1.2d 33, 41; People v. Honeycutt, supra, 
.29 Ca1.2d 52, 62; People v. Dail, 22 Ca1.2d 642, 653 [140 
P.2d 828].) 
As we ha\'e observed above, there is ample evidence that 
would justify the jury's concluding that the homicide was 
not deliberate and premeditated and was therefore not mur-
der of the first degree. Under the first instruction, however, 
the jury may have concluded that even though the killing 
was hasty and hurried, impUlsive and unstudied, it would 
nevertheless be first degree murder. If the jury followed this 
instruction, it may have found the existence of facts showing 
no more than second degree murder and yet returned a verdict 
of first degree murder. 
[5] The trial court did not instruct the jury that ad-
missions of defendant were to be viewed with caution. Sec-
tion 2061 (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides th3t 
the jury is "to be instructed by the court on all proper oc-
casions . . . that the testimony of an accomplice ought til 
be viewed with distrust, and the evidence of the oral ad-
missions of a party with caution." The court should have 
given such an instruction on its own motion. (People Y, 
Bemis. 33 Ca1.2d 395, 398-399 [202 P.2d 82);· People Y. 
Hamilton, 33 Ca1.2d 45, 51 [198 P.2d 873] ; People Y. Cornett, 
33 Ca1.2d 33,40 [198 P.2d 877) ; People v. Koenig. 29 Ca1.2d 
87.94 [173 P.2d 1).) 
Defendant's alleged statement to Mrs. Stillwell after the 
shooting, "I told you I was going to kill him, so I killed 
him. " and his statement to the spectators, "I told you guys 
I was going to kill him," were key parts of the People's 
proof of premeditation and deliberation. [6] The burden 
was on the People to prove defendant guilty of first degree 
murder beyond a reasonable doubt. In determining whether 
that burden had been met, a difficult question on the facts of 
the present case, the jury should have been given the instruc-
tion required by section 2061 (4). Defendant's admissions 
were vitally important evidence in this case; it was likewise 
vitally important that the jury be guided as to the manner 
in which it was to view that evidence. 
['1] The jury was instructed that, "Upon a trial for mur-
der, the commission of the homicide by the defendant being 
proved, the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation, 
or that justify or excuse it, devolves upon him, unless the 
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crime committed only amounts to manslaughter, or that the 
defendant was justifiable or excusable. But sucb proof need 
not be by a preponderance of tbe evidence, but only to an 
extent sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of 
the jurors as to his guilt or the mitigating circumstances. You 
are further instructed that where, as in this case, tbe defendant 
bas produced no evidence in his own behalf, he may have the 
benefit, in determining the matters expressed in this instruc· 
tion, of the evidence produced by the prosecution if and 
when it is to his advantage to do so." The first. part of this 
instruction was in the language of section 1105 of the Penal 
Code. 
This court has held repeatedly that a jury should not be 
instructed in the language of section 1105. (People v. Le-
tourneau" 34 Cal.2d 478, 490-491 [211 P.2d 865]; People v. 
Cornett, 33 Cal.2d 33, 42-44 [198 P.2d 877] ; People v. Valen. 
tine, 28 Ca1.2d 121, 132-134 [169 P.2d 1] ; People v. Thomas, 
25 Cal.2d 880, 895-896 [156 P.2d 7].) The jurY was not 
advised that such an instruction would have no application 
in determining the degree of murder and that it could apply 
only . in determining whether the homicide was murder or 
manslaughter, or was excusable or justifiable. (People v. 
Thomas, supra, 25 Ca1.2d 880, 897.) The words "circum-
stances of mitigation tt may have been interpreted by the jury 
to include circumstances that reduce the homicide from murder 
in the first degree to murder in the second degree. The error 
was particularly serious in the present case, since one of tbe 
most difficult questions before the .jury was whether the homi-
cide was first degree murder, second degree murder, or vol-
untary manslaugbter. As we recently pointed out, such an 
instruction "may have the effect of foreclosing any considera· 
. tion by the jury that mitigating circumstances, althougb not 
sufficient in law to justify or excuse the homicide, may be 
. enough to reduce the crime to second degree murder by coun-
: teracting the element of premeditation and deliberation." 
(People v. Cornett, supra, 33 Ca1.2d 33, 43.) 
[8] Section 1105 does not place on a defendant the bur-
den of persuasion, but merely declares a rule of procedure 
that imposes on him a duty of going forward with evidence 
of mitigating circumstances. (People v. Cornett, supra, 33 
Cal.2d 33, 42; see 9 So.Cal.L.Rev. 405.) If the jurY is in-
structed in the words of the statute alone, it may be misled 
into construing the "burden of proving circumstances of miti-
gation" as imposing llpon the defendant the burden of persua-
I 
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sion and into believing that mitigating circumstances do not 
exist unless the defendant proves the existence of such circum-
stances by a preponderance of the evidence. (See People v. 
Oornett, supra, 33Ca1.2d at 42-43.) [9] 'l'he trial court 
in the present case attempted to meet this objection by adding, 
"but such proof need not be by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, but only to an extent sufficient to raise a reasonable 
doubt in the minds of the jurors as to his guilt or the mitigat-
ing circumstances" and by explaining that defendant could 
take advantage of evidence produced by the prosecution. These 
additional statements may have avoided some of the confusion 
that would result from a reading of section 1105 alone (People 
v. Leddy, 95 Cal.App. 659, 672 [273 P. 110] ; see People v. 
Cornett, supra, 33 Ca1.2d at 44), although the jury should have 
been expressly told in connection with the instruction on sec-
tion 1105, that the prosecution has the burden throughout 
the trial to prove every element of the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt and that the burden of persuasion never shifts to 
the defendant. [10] In any event, an instruction in the lan-
guage of section 1105, even with an adequate explanation of its 
meaning, has no proper place in a charge to the jury. As we 
stated in Poople v. Thomas, supra, 25 Ca1.2d 880, "logic sug-
gests that since such section in reality merely declares a rule 
of procedure and does not relieve the state of the burden of 
proving each and every essential element of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt the propriety of reading it to the jury, even 
with a proper explanation, is doubtful." (25 Cal.2d at 896; 
see, also, discussion in California Jury Instructions Criminal 
[1946], p. 283.) 
[11] Defendant contends that three instructions· on the 
right of self-defense should not have been given. He does not 
contend that the instructions were incorrectly worded, but 
invokes the rule that it is error to give instructions on prin-
·"The right of self-defense exists only as against an unlawful attack. 
The right does not exist, even though bodily injury appears probable, 
88 against a person who, in threatening or appearing to threaten injury, 
is acting lawfully." (People's Instruction No. 23.) 
, 'If an assault with the :lists is being made on a person, but without 
intent to kill or to do great bodily harm, and if the assault is not likely 
to produce great bodily injury, and if the one thus attacked is Dot de-
ceived as to the character of such an assault, he is not justified in using 
a deadly weapon in self-defense." (People's Instruction No. 25.) 
, 'The law does not permit or justify one who intends to commit an 
assault upon another to design in advance his own defense by instigating 
a quarrel or a combat with a view thereby to create a situation wherein 
the infliction of the intended injury will appear to have been dODe in 
.elf-defense." (People'. Instruction No. 26.) 
) 
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ciples of law that have no application to the facts of a case. 
(People v. Sanchez, 30 Ca1.2d 560, 572 [184 P.2d 673] ; People 
Y. Silver, 16 Ca1.2d 714, 722 [108 P.2d 4] ; People v. Roe, 189 
Cal. 548, 558 [209 P. 560] ; People v. Geibel, 93 Cal.App.2d 
147, 178 [208 P.2d 743].) 
From a review of the record it appears that each instruc-
tion was properly given. Instruction No. 23 was justified 
by the evidence. In view of defendant's statement to Cow-
boy, in the presence of Stillwell, that had he been Cowboy 
he would have killed Stillwell, and his statement in the bar, 
"Turn me loose, I'll kill him,t' it could be inferred that 
defendant came out of the bar to kill Stillwell, that Stillwell 
knew it, and that he acted lawfully when he seized the tire 
pump and struck defendant. Instruction No. 25 was also 
justified by the evidence. At the time defendant fired the 
fatal shots, Stillwell had dropped the tire pump and had 
made no attempt either to retrieve it or pick up the gun. 
Instruction No. 26 was likewise proper; the jury could infer 
from the evidence that defendant was the aggressor through-
out. 
CONCLUSION 
[12] Three serious errors were committed at the trial of 
this case: (I) The instruction on premeditation and deliber-
ation was erroneous; (2) The instruction in the language of 
section 1105 of the Penal Code failed to advise the jury that 
it had no application in its determination of the degree of 
murder; and (3) The jury was not. instructed as required 
by section 2061 (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
A number of cases have held that such errors requiredre-
versal (People v. Carme11, 36 Ca1.2d 768 [228 P.2d 281] [error 
(1), supra, combined with other errors] ; People v. Bemis, 33 
Ca1.2d 395 [202 P.2d 82) [error (3)]; People v. Cornett, 33 
CaI.2d 33 [198 P.2d 877) [errors (1), (2), and (3)]; People 
v. Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121 (169 P.2d 1] (errors (1) and (2)]; 
People v. Thom.as, 25 Ca1.2d 880 (156 P.2d .7] [errors (1) 
and (2)]); in other cases, relied upon by the People, this 
court has concluded that the evidence of guilt was so over-
whelming that reversal was not indicated. (People v. Le-
tourneau,34 Ca1.2d 478 [211 P.2d 865J [errors (2) and (3)]; 
People v. Hilton, 29 Cal.2d 217 [174 P.2d 5] [error (1)]; 
People tI. Keonig, 29 Cal.2d 87 [173 P.2d 1] [error (3)]; 
People Y. Honeycutt, 29 Ca1.2d 52 [172 P.2d 698] [error (1)]; 
People v. BerMrd,28 Cal.2d 207 [169 P.2d 636] [error (1)].) 
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Each case necessarily turns on its own facts. A careful 
examination of the entire record in this case leads to the con-
clusion that it is not improbable that a correctly instructed 
jury would have reached a different verdict. The evidence, 
although sufficient to sustain a conviction of first degree mur-
der, would readily justify a conviction of a lesser degree of 
homicide. Each error in this case tended to lead the jury 
to a verdict of first degree murder even though it may have 
drawn inferences from the evidence showing no more than 
second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. As in 
People v. Cornett, supra, 33 Ca1.2d 33, where the errors were 
identical with those in the present case, reversal is necessary 
to avoid a miscarriage of justice. 
The judgment and the order denying the motion for a new 
trial are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
